The paper argues that many explanations of past health policy legislative failures or successes have relied upon idiosyncratic ?one off? explanations that do not take account of the long run of observational data that are available on this question. For example, after the demise of the Clinton Plan in the early 1990s, some offered as an explanation the fact that the proposal was developed primarily in the executive branch and then moved into Congress as the key explanation for its failure. Similarly, as the ACA hung in the balance in early 2010 and seemed like it would not pass, some were saying that President Obama had made a mistake by letting the proposal be first developed in the Congress and therefore had not put his stamp on the bill.� Opposite conclusions, using only 2 examples. Looking at a longer run of empirical data provides better information.
When a bill doesn?t pass, we tend to look for specific reasons that this particular bill, containing these particular provisions, relying on those particular politicians, and using that particular political strategy, failed. But most bills fail. Almost all of them, in fact. What?s surprising is when they succeed. That?s when you need to examine what made this specific case different.
Source: http://feeds.washingtonpost.com/click.phdo?i=84272af168f76eecceaa54907a02f560
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